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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents feel that a further enlarged statement
of facts is necessary to understand more fully the matter
in issue. The agreement pleaded in the complaint and
before the court for ~construction was entered into on
December 9, 1953, with the appellants of the one part and
the respondents of the other part. That prior thereto,
all of the parties to this action constituted the Cache
Valley Medical Group and leased the premises involved
in this action from Zions Security Corporation. This
lease provided: (Para. 4, Pl. Exh. 2) "Lessee rnay have
the right of substituting occupants in the improved office
space if one or more of the Lessees shall remove from the
premises or other members join the group."
And in paragraph 2 of said lease: "This lease shall
be subject to termination by lessee at any time upon ninety
days written notice to the lessor."
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Prior to August 7, 1953, the respondents decided to
move from the premises, and served notice upon the
appellants of their intention so to do. This notice is part
of the record in this case identified as plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.
A controversary arose as to the right of the respondents
to move out and be relieved of paying rent under the
lease, and the Agreement of December 9, 1953, which is
set out in full in the complaint and in Findings of Fact
No. 2, was entered into as a compromise setttlement.
(Tr. 57) The respondents agreed to pay the appellants
the sum of $55.00 per month during the term of the Zion's
lease. The appellants then agreed to return to the respondents the sum of $20.00 per month to cover the space
which had theretofore been used by all of the parties
jointly. The effect of this was to leave a net rental which
the respondents were to pay to the appellants of $35.00
per month to cover the space which had been occupied
by the respondents individually. (Tr. 39 and 40, 58 and
and 59). The respondents paid this net rental of $35.00
for the months of December, 1953 and January, 1954,
(Tr. 75) and then dis~covered that appellant Dr. C. C.
Randall had moved into and occupied the rooms which
had been previously occupied by respondent Dr. M. C.
Daines, and thereupon respondents refused to pay the
full $35.00 per month and tendered the sum of $17.50 for
the month of February, 1954. (Tr. 74). This lawsuit
followed, consisting of an action by the appellants to
collect the full February rental in the sum of $35.00 from
respondents.
The question before the lower court was the interpretation of the following paragraph found in the compromise agreement of December 9, 1953:
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"It is further agreed that if the space upon which
Doctors C. J. Daio.es and M. C. Daines are paying
rent is sub-leased or rented to another party other
than a member of the now existing group, thereby
increasing the revenue received by the Cache Valley
~vledical Group, that Doctors C. J. Daines and M. C.
Daines are no longer obligated to pay rent on said
space while so rented."
The lower court determined that under said Agreement, the respondents were paying said $35.00 per month
rent on specific space, i.e., that used by them prior to
their moving, and that under said agreement they were
entitled to sub-lease said space in order to reduce the
amount they had agreed to pay, and that they would be
unable to exercise this right so long as Dr. C. C. Randall
occuipied it without their permission. The court thereupon determined that until Dr. Randall vacated said
space, the respondents were relieved from paying one-half
of said net rental.
ARGUMENT
This case was tried before the District Judge sitting
without a jury. He heard the testimony of the witnesses
and confronted them face to face. His findings are supported by the evidence and his conclusions of law are
supported by the findings. Both the findings and the
conclusions of law support the judgment. We see no
basis upon which appellants can rely to have this judgInent reversed by this court.
It is respondents' theory of this case that under the
agreement of December 9, 1953, they were paying $35.00
per month rental on certain specific space, to-wit: Rooms
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3, 4 and 5, which said rooms they had occupied exclusively
while they were associated with the Group. It is their
further theory that under the paragraph under interpretation, they had the right to sublease said space if desired.
This sublease could be either to a member of the remaining group or to another party other than a member of the
remaining group.
If the sublease was to a member of the remaining
Group, or to another party when there was no increase in
rental to the group, the net rental to be paid by the respondents would remain at $35.00 per month. If the
sublease was to another party other than a member of the
remaining group, and rent was received from this sublessee, then the net rental to be paid by the respondents
.would be reduced. But in any event, it was the respondents, who were paying rent on the space, who could give
the permission for a sub-tenant to move into this space.
The record is clear that no such permission was given to
Dr. Randall to move into the space upon which the respondents were paying rent, and the court properly found
;·;·;that the act of Dr. Randall in so doing constituted an
evictio;n.
The lower court accepted this theory of the case, and
rightly so. Appelants argue that the respondents were
not paying rent for any specific portion of the building,
and state there was no particular portion of the building
allotted to any individual. The evidence of witnesses for
the appellants themselves, shows otherwise. Dr. Randall
admitted on cross-examination that although there were
no written agreements as to which space each would occupy, there were oral agreements. And see the testimony
of Dr. C. J. n~aines on this point at page 72 of the Tran-
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script, and of Dr. M. C. Daines at page 93. Dr. Randall
further stated that each of their individual rooms was
theirs, and that no one else in the Group would concern
themselves with nor interfere with those individual rooms.
(Tr. 41, 42, 43 and 44). Dr. Randall also testified (Tr.
58 and 59) that the $35.00 per month rental paid by the
respondents under the December 9th agreement was for
the space they (respondents) had been using sparately.
Dr. Porter, another of the appellants, testified to the same
effect, that the $35.00 per month net rental was for the
individual space of the respondents. ( Tr. 39 and 40).
And there are other factors which bear out the court's
interpretation of the transaction. The agreement, in the
paragraph set out in full above, specifically refers to
"the space upon which (respondents) are paying
rent # # • " (underlining ours).
And specific use is made in said paragraph of the legal
words "subleased." If we give the proper import to this
language, it can mean only one thing, i.e., that the respondents agreed to pay rent to the appellants for certaiAI
space. This sets up a landlord and tenant relationship.
The agreement then states that if this space is sub/cased,
certain rights and liabilities wil arise. This leads to the
inescapable conclusion that it is the respondents, the ones
who agreed to pay rent on this certain space, who have
the authority to sub-lease said space. It would certainly
be a new twist to the law of landlord and tenant if it
were to be held that the landlord could sub-lease the
demised premises out from under the tenant who was
paying rent upon it and otherwise complying with the
terms of the rental agreement.
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·We think that by reason of the paragraph in question,
the respondents had the right to sub-lease the space upon
which they were paying rent. If they sub-leased to a
member of the remaining group free of further rent, then
respondents were required to continue to pay the net
rental of $35.00 per month. However, if respondents were
·able to sub-lease to a tenant other than a member of the
remaining group and secure rent from such a sub-lease,
then they could. relieve themselves of the rent they had
agreed to pay.
It is undisputed that Dr. Randall moved into part of
the space upon which the respondents were paying rent
and that said move was made without their consent. He
further stated that he would not move out to make way
for a sub-lessee unless he (Dr. Randall) approved of the
new· tenant. Such a position, if upheld effectually blocks
the respondents from securing a sub-tenant, and forces
them to pay the monthly rental as long as Dr. Randall
desir~s, and during which time, mind you, while Dr.
Randall would be using the space upon which the respondents would be paying rent.
What constitutes an eviction varies under different
circuinstances, but all authorities agree that:
"When use or possession ceases by reason of an act
of the landlord, the consideration for the payment of
rent ceases or fails.,, 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, s·ec. 478, p. 391.
What possible use or possession, or what right or control
over the rented premises, could be exercised by the re·spondents so long as Dr. Randall occupies them and refuses ·to move except to give way to a sub-lessee of his
own choosing?
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In concluding there are several points raised in appellants' brief, which should be commented on.
On page 7, appellants argue the point that respondents, in the August notice of their intention to move, made
no claim that the space could not be occupied by the
remaining members. It is obvious from the record that
when this notice was sent, the respondents were operating
under the theory that ~nder the terms of the Zion's lease,
they could move and be relieved from contributing to the
Groups rental. In other words, that it was contemplated
under paragraph 4 of the Zion's lease that the group could
change its membership. Why then, under such a theory,
should there be any statement in such a notice that the
rooms should be left vacant. When the appellants did
not agree to this theory, a dispute arose, resulting in the
December 9th Agreement. But this was long after the
August notice had been sent.
Appellants' brief carries throughout its pages several
assertions that no one has ever applied or been interested
in sub-leasing the space. The record shows otherwise.
( Tr. 87 and 88). Without doubt, there were discussions
with at least one doctor, and probably others, about subleasing the very space involved in this lawsuit.
Finally, on pages 8 and 9 appellants take some of the
testimony of Dr. M. C. Daines out of context, and attempt
to make it sound as though there were only one course of
action open to the parties, i.e., bringing in someone from
the outset thereby increasing the revenue. A study of the
other testimony of Dr. M. C. Daines will show that it was
his opinion that if someone else, other than him or his
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father, occupied the premises involved without permission
of the Daines', that the Daines would be relieved of paying
rent. ( Tr. 95 and 98).
CONCLUSION
This is not an important case from the viewpoint of
the substantive law of this state or insofar as the amount
involved is concerned. And because of the singular nature
of the particular provision before the court for construction, there is no case in point to refer to for guidance in
making a decision. The District Judge had the benefit
of having· the parties to the agreement before him, and
·based on the evidence presented by them, he entered
finding~ of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in favor
of the defendants below, respondents here. These findings of fact are supported by the evidence, and the conclusions reached from these findings are fair ones and
reasonable ones. They support the judgment entered by
the court. It is respondents' belief that under such circunms~ances, the interpretation placed on the agreement
·by the lower court, as reflected in said findings, conclusions and judgment, should not be lightly overturned.
In our opinion, the judgment below should be affirmed.
Respectfuly submitted,
BULLEN & OLSON
By Charles P. Olson
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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